https://doi.org/10.1140/epjqt/s40507-023-00178-x
Research
Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
1
Russian Quantum Center, Skolkovo, 121205, Moscow, Russia
2
Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo, E-36310, Vigo, Spain
3
atlanTTic Research Center, University of Vigo, E-36310, Vigo, Spain
4
NTI Center for Quantum Communications, National University of Science and Technology MISiS, 119049, Moscow, Russia
5
HSE University, 101000, Moscow, Russia
6
Institute for Quantum Information & State Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing, College of Computer Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, 410073, Changsha, People’s Republic of China
Received:
10
February
2023
Accepted:
4
June
2023
Published online:
26
June
2023
Attacks that control single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution using tailored bright illumination are capable of eavesdropping the secret key. Here we report an automated testbench that checks the detector’s vulnerabilities against these attacks. We illustrate its performance by testing a free-running detector that includes a rudimentary countermeasure measuring an average photocurrent. While our testbench automatically finds the detector to be controllable in a continuous-blinding regime, the countermeasure registers photocurrent significantly exceeding that in a quantum regime, thus revealing the attack. We then perform manually a pulsed blinding attack, which controls the detector intermittently. This attack is missed by the countermeasure in a wide range of blinding pulse durations and powers, still allowing to eavesdrop the key. We make recommendations for improvement of both the testbench and countermeasure.
© The Author(s) 2023
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