https://doi.org/10.1140/epjqt/s40507-024-00290-6
Research
Electromagnetic side-channel attack risk assessment on a practical quantum-key-distribution receiver based on multi-class classification
1
Institute of Photonics and Quantum Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, EH14 4AS, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
2
Escuela de Ingeniería de Sistemas y Computación, Universidad del Valle, Ciudad Universitaria Meléndez, Cali, Colombia
Received:
15
August
2024
Accepted:
4
November
2024
Published online:
18
November
2024
While quantum key distribution (QKD) is a theoretically secure way of growing quantum-safe encryption keys, many practical implementations are challenged due to various open attack vectors, resulting in many variations of QKD protocols. Side channels are one such vector that allows a passive or active eavesdropper to obtain QKD information leaked through practical devices. This paper assesses the feasibility and implications of extracting the raw secret key from far-field radiated emissions from the single-photon avalanche diodes used in a BB84 QKD quad-detector receiver. Enhancement of the attack was also demonstrated through the use of deep-learning model to distinguish radiated emissions due to the four polarized encoding states. To evaluate the severity of such side-channel attack, multi-class classification based on raw-data and pre-processed data is implemented and assessed. Results show that classifiers based on both raw-data and pre-processed features can discern variations of the electromagnetic emissions caused by specific orientations of the detectors within the receiver with an accuracy higher than 90%. This research proposes machine learning models as a technique to assess EM information leakage risk of QKD and highlights the feasibility of side-channel attacks in the far-field region, further emphasizing the need to utilise mechanisms to avoid electromagnetic radiation information leaks and measurement-device-independent QKD protocols.
Key words: Quantum key distribution / Quantum communication / Single-photon avalanche diode / Single-photon detector / Information leakage / Electromagnetic security / Side channel attack
© Crown 2024
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